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Abstract
Since Pearl’s seminal work on providing a formal language for causality, the subject has garnered
a lot of interest among philosophers and researchers in artificial intelligence alike. One of the most
debated topics in this context is the notion of actual causation, which concerns itself with specific –
as opposed to general – causal claims. The search for a proper formal definition of actual causation
has evolved into a controversial debate, that is pervaded with ambiguities and confusion. The goal
of our research is twofold. First, we wish to provide a clear way to compare competing definitions.
Second, we want to improve upon these definitions so they can be applied to a more diverse range
of instances, including non-deterministic ones. To achieve these goals we provide a general, ab-
stract definition of actual causation, formulated in the context of the expressive language of CP-logic
(Causal Probabilistic logic). We will then show that three recent definitions by Ned Hall (originally
formulated for structural models) and a definition of our own (formulated for CP-logic directly) can
be viewed and directly compared as instantiations of this abstract definition, which also allows them
to deal with a broader range of examples.
KEYWORDS: actual causation, CP-logic, counterfactual dependence
1 Introduction
Suppose we know the causal laws that govern some domain, and that we then observe a
story that takes place in this domain; when should we now say that, in this particular story,
one event caused another? Ever since Lewis (1973) first analyzed this problem of actual
causation (a.k.a. token causation) in terms of counterfactual dependence, philosophers and
researchers from the AI community alike have been trying to improve on his attempt. Fol-
lowing (Pearl 2000), structural equations have become a popular formal framework for this
(Hitchcock 2007; Hitchcock 2009; Halpern and Pearl 2005a; Halpern and Hitchcock ). A
notable exception is the work of Ned Hall, who has extensively critiziced the privileged
role of structural equations for causal modelling, as well as the definitions that have been
expressed with it. He has proposed several definitions himself (2003; 2004; 2007), the lat-
est of which is a sophisticated attempt to overcome the flaws he observes in those that rely
too heavily on structural equations. We have developed a definition of our own in (Beckers
and Vennekens 2012; Vennekens 2011), within the framework of CP-logic (Causal Proba-
bilistic logic).
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The relation between these different approaches is currently not well understood. In-
deed, they are all expressed using different formalisms (e.g., neuron diagrams, structural
equations, CP-logic, or just natural language). Therefore, comparisons between them are
limited to verifying on which examples they (dis)agree. In this paper, we work towards a
remedy for this situation. We will present a general, parametrized definition of actual cau-
sation in the context of the expressive language of CP-logic. Exploiting the fact that neuron
diagrams and structural equations can both be reduced to CP-logic, we will then show that
our definition and three definitions by Ned Hall can be seen as particular instantiations
of this parametrized definition. This immediately provides a clear, conceptual picture of
the similarities and differences between these approaches. Our analysis thus allows for a
formal and fundamental comparison between them.
This general framework for comparing different approaches to actual causation is the
main contribution of this paper. In addition, placing existing approaches in this framework
may make it easier to improve/extend them. Our versions of Hall’s definitions illustrate
this, as their scope is expanded to also include non-deterministic examples, and cases of
causation by omission. Further, our formulations prove to be simpler than the original ones
and their application becomes more straightforward. While our ambition is to work towards
a framework that encompasses a large variety of approaches to actual causation, this goal is
obviously infeasible within the scope of a single paper. We have therefore chosen to focus
most of our attention on Hall, because his work is both among the most refined and most
influential in this field; in addition, it is also representative for a larger body of work in the
counterfactual tradition.
We first introduce the CP-logic language in Section 2. In Section 3, a general definition
of actual causation is first presented, and then instantiated into four concrete definitions.
Section 4 offers a succinct representation of all these definitions, and an illustration of how
they compare to each other.
2 CP-logic
We give a short, informal introduction to CP-logic. A detailed description can be found in
(Vennekens et al. 2009). The basic syntactical unit of CP-logic is a CP-law, which takes
the general form Head ← Body. The body can in general consist of any first-order logic
formula. However, in this paper, we restrict our attention to conjunctions of ground literals.
The head contains a disjunction of atoms annotated with probabilities, representing the
possible effects of this law. When the probabilities in a head do not add up to one, we
implicitly assume an empty disjunct, annotated with the remaining probability.
Each CP-law models a specific causal mechanism. Informally, if the Body of the law is
satisfied, then at some point it will be applied, meaning one of the disjuncts in the Head
is chosen, each with their respective probabilities. If a disjunct is chosen containing an
atom that is not yet true, then this law causes it to become true; otherwise, the law has no
effect. A finite set of such CP-laws forms a CP-theory, and represents the causal structure
of the domain at hand. The domain unfolds by laws being applied one after another, where
multiple orders are often possible, and each law is applied at most once. We illustrate with
an example from (Hall 2004):
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Fig. 1: Probability tree for Suzy and Billy.
Suzy and Billy each decide to throw a rock at a bottle. When Suzy does so, her rock shatters the
bottle with probability 0.9. Billy’s aim is slightly worse and he only hits with probability 0.8.
This small causal domain can be expressed by the following CP-theory T :
Throws(Suzy)← . (1)
T hrows(Billy)← . (2)
(Breaks : 0.9)← T hrows(Suzy). (3)
(Breaks : 0.8)← T hrows(Billy). (4)
The first two laws are vacuous (i.e., they will be applied in every story) and deterministic
(i.e., they have only one possible outcome, where we leave implicit the probability 1). The
last two laws are non-deterministic, causing either the bottle to break or nothing at all.
The given theory summarizes all possible stories that can take place in this model. For
example, it allows for the story consisting of the following chain of events:
Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. How-
ever Billy’s throw was also accurate, and would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted
by Suzy’s throw.
To formalize this idea, the semantics of CP-logic uses probability trees (Shafer 1996). For
this example, one such tree is shown in Figure 1. Here, each node represents a state of the
domain, which is characterized by an assignment of truth values to the atomic formulas,
in this case T hrows(Suzy), T hrows(Billy) and Breaks. In the initial state of the domain
(the root node), all atoms are assigned their default value false. In this example, the bottle
is initially unbroken and the rocks are still in Billy and Suzy’s hands. The children of a
node x are the result of the application of a law: each edge (x,y) corresponds to a specific
disjunct that was chosen from the head of the law that was applied in node x. In this
particular case, law (1) is applied first, so the assignment in the child-node is obtained
by setting T hrows(Suzy) to true, its deviant value. The third state has two child-nodes,
corresponding to law (3) being applied and either breaking the bottle (left child) or not
(right child). The leftmost branch is thus the formal counterpart of the above story, where
the last edge represents the fact that Billy’s throw was also accurate, even though there was
no bottle left to break. A branch ends when no more laws can be applied.
A probability tree of a theory T in CP-logic defines an a priori probability distribution
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PT over all things that might happen in this domain, which can be read off the leaf nodes
of the branches by multiplying the probabilities on the edges. For instance, the probability
of the bottle breaking is the sum of the probabilities of the leaves in which Breaks is true –
the white circles in Figure 1 – giving 0.98. We have shown here only one such probability
tree, but we can construct others as well by applying the laws in different orders.
An important property however is that all trees defined by the same theory result in the
same probability distribution. To ensure that this property holds even when there are bodies
containing negative literals, CP-logic makes use of the well-founded semantics. Simply
put, this means the condition for a law to be applied in a node is not merely that its body
is currently satisfied, but that it will remain so. This implies that a negated atom in a body
should not only be currently assigned false, but actually has to have become impossible,
so that it will remain false through to the end-state. For atoms currently assigned true, it
always holds that they remain true, hence here there is no problem.
2.0.1 Counterfactual Probabilities
In the context of structural equations, (Pearl 2000) studies counterfactuals and shows how
they can be evaluated by means of a syntactic transformation. In their study of actual cau-
sation and explanations, (Halpern and Pearl 2005b, p. 27) also define counterfactual prob-
abilities (i.e., the probability that some event would have had in a counterfactual situation).
(Vennekens et al. 2010) present an equivalent method for evaluating counterfactual proba-
bilities in CP-logic, also making use of syntactic transformations.
Assume we have a branch b of a probability tree of some theory T . To make T deter-
ministic in accordance with the choices made in b, we transform T into T b by replacing
the heads of the laws that were applied in b with the disjuncts that were chosen from those
heads in b. For example, if we take as branch b the previous story, then T b would be:
Throws(Suzy)← .
T hrows(Billy)← .
Breaks ← T hrows(Suzy).
Breaks ← T hrows(Billy).
We will use Pearl’s do()-operator to indicate an intervention (Pearl 2000). The interven-
tion on a theory T that ensures variable C remains false, denoted by do(¬C), removes C
from the head of any law in which it occurs, yielding T |do(¬C). For example, to prevent
Suzy from throwing, the resulting theory T |do(¬Throws(Suzy)) is given by:
← .
T hrows(Billy)← .
(Breaks : 0.9)← T hrows(Suzy).
(Breaks : 0.8)← T hrows(Billy).
Laws with an empty head are ineffective, and can thus simply be omitted. The analogous
operation do(C) on a theory T corresponds to adding the deterministic law C ←.
With this in hand, we can now evaluate a Pearl-style counterfactual probability “given
that b in fact occurred, the probability that ¬E would have occurred if ¬C had been the
case” as PTb(¬E|do(¬C)).
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3 Defining Actual Causation Using CP-logic
We now formulate a general, parametrized definition of actual causation, which can ac-
commodate several concrete definitions by filling in details that we first leave open. We
demonstrate this using definitions by Hall and one by ourselves. For the rest of the pa-
per, we assume that we are given a CP-theory T , an actual story b in which both C and
E occurred, and we are interested in whether or not C caused E . By Con we denote the
quadruple (T,b,C,E), and refer to this as a context.
3.1 Actual Causation in General
For reasons of simplicity, the majority of approaches (including Hall) only consider actual
causation in a deterministic setting. Further, it is taken for granted that the actual values of
all variables are given. In such a context, counterfactual dependence of the event E on C is
expressed by the conditional: if do(¬C) then ¬E , where it is assumed that all exogenous
variables take on their actual values. In our probabilistic setting, the latter translates into
making those laws that were actually applied deterministic, in accordance with the choices
made in the story. However in many cases some exogenous variables simply do not have an
actual value to start with. For example, if Suzy is prevented from throwing her rock, then
we cannot say what the accuracy would have been had she done so. In CP-logic, this would
be represented by the fact that law (3) is not applied. Hence, in a more general setting, it
is required only that do(¬C) makes ¬E possible. In other words, we get a probabilistic
definition of counterfactual dependence:
Definition 1 (Dependence)
E is counterfactually dependent on C in (T,b) iff PTb(¬E|do(¬C))> 0.
As counterfactual dependency lies at the heart of causation for all of the approaches
we are considering, Dependence represents the most straightforward definition of actual
causation. It is however too crude and allows for many counterexamples, preemption being
the most famous.
More refined definitions agree with the general structure of the former, but modify the
theory T in more subtle ways than T b does. We identify two different kinds of laws in T ,
that should each be treated in a specific way. The first are the laws that are intrinsic with
respect to the given context. These should be made deterministic in accordance with b. The
second are laws that are irrelevant in the given context. These should simply be ignored.
Together, the methods of determining which laws are intrinsic and irrelevant, respectively,
will be the parameters of our general definition. Suppose we are given two functions Int
and Irr, which both map each context (T,b,C,E) to a subset of the theory T . With these,
we define actual causation as follows:
Definition 2 (Actual causation given Int and Irr)
Given the context Con, we define that C is an actual cause of E if and only if E is counter-
factually dependent on C according to the theory T ′ that we construct as:
T ′ = [T \ (Irr(Con)∪ Int(Con))]∪ Int(Con)b.
For instance, the naive approach that identifies actual causation with counterfactual de-
pendence corresponds to taking Irr as the constant function {} and Int(Con) as {r ∈ T | r
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was applied in b}. From now on, we use the following, more legible notation for a partic-
ular instantiation of this definition:
Dependence-Irr 1
No law r is irrelevant.
Dependence-Intr 1
A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b.
If desired, we can order different causes by their respective counterfactual probabilities,
as this indicates how important the cause was for E .
3.2 Beckers and Vennekens 2012 Definition
A recent proposal by the current authors for a definition of actual causation was originally
formulated in (Vennekens 2011), and later slightly modified in (Beckers and Vennekens
2012). Here, we summarize the basic ideas of the latter, and refer to it as BV12. We re-
formulate this definition in order to fit into our framework. It is easily verified that both
versions are equivalent.
Because we want to follow the actual story as closely as possible, the condition for
intrinsicness is exactly like before: we force all laws that were applied in b to have the
same effect as they had in b.
To decide which laws were relevant for causing E in our story, we start from a simple
temporal criterion: every law that was applied after the effect E took place is irrelevant,
and every law that was applied before isn’t. For example, to figure out why the bottle broke
in our previous example, law (4) is considered irrelevant, because the bottle was already
broken by the time Billy’s rock arrived. For laws that were not applied in b, we distinguish
laws that could still be applied when E occurred, from those that could not. The first are
considered irrelevant, whereas the second aren’t. This ensures that any story b′ that is
identical to b up to and including the occurrence of E provides the same judgements about
the causes of E , since any law that is not applied in b but is applied in b′, must obviously
occur after E .
BV12-Irrelevant 1
A law r is irrelevant iff r was not applied before E in b, although it could have. (I.e., it was
not impossible at the time when E occurred.)
BV12-Intrinsic 1
A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b.
3.3 Hall 2007
One of the currently most refined concepts of actual causation is that of (Hall 2007). Al-
though Hall uses structural equations as a practical tool, he is of the opinion that intuitions
about actual causation are best illustrated using neuron diagrams. A key advantage of these
diagrams, which they share with CP-logic, is that they distinguish between a default and
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deviant state of a variable. Proponents of structural equations, on the other hand, countered
Hall’s approach by criticizing neuron diagrams’ limited expressivity (Hitchcock 2009, p.
398). Indeed, a neuron diagram, and thus Hall’s approach as well, is very limited in the kind
of examples it can express. In particular, neuron diagrams can only express deterministic
causal relations and they also lack the ability to directly express causation by omission, i.e.,
that the absence of C causes E . Hall’s solution is to argue against causation by omission
altogether. By contrast, we will offer an improvement of Hall’s account that generalizes to
a probabilistic context, and can also handle causation by omission. In short, we propose
CP-logic as a way of overcoming the shortcomings of both structural equations and neuron
diagrams.
In a neuron diagram, a neuron can be in one of two states, the default “off” state and the
deviant “on” state in which the neuron “fires”. Different kinds of links define how the state
of one node affects the other. For instance, in (a), E fires iff at least one of B or D fires, D
fires iff C fires, and B fires iff A fires and C doesn’t fire. Nodes that are “on” are represented
by full circles and nodes that are “off” are shown as empty circles.
A
C D
EB
Fig. 2: (a)
C D
EA B
Fig. 3: (b)
Diagrams (a) and (b) represent the same causal structure, but different stories: in both cases
there are two causal chains leading to E , one starting with C and another starting with A.
But in (a) the chain through B is preempted by C, whereas in (b) there is nothing for C to
preempt, as A doesn’t even fire. Therefore (a) is an example of what is generally known as
Early Preemption, whereas (b) is not.
Although Hall presents his arguments using neuron diagrams, his definitions are formu-
lated in terms of structural equations that correspond to such diagrams in a straightforward
way: for each endogenous variable there is one equation, which contains a propositional
formula on the right concisely expressing the dependencies of the diagram.
Any structural model M can also be read as a CP-logic theory T . The firing of the
neurons and the resulting assignment to the variables in M, then correspond to a story b.
One important difference between structural equations and CP-laws, is that we are not
limited to using a single CP-law for each variable. As each law represents a separate causal
mechanism, and only one mechanism can actually make a variable become true, we will
represent dependencies such as that of E by three laws, corresponding to the three different
ways in which B and D can cause E: each by themselves, or the two of them simultaneously.
At first sight the conjunctive law may seem redundant, but if one has a temporal condition
for irrelevance – eg. BV12 – then it may not be. The translation of examples (a) and (b) into
CP-logic is given by the following CP-theory – where p and q represent some probabilities:
(A : p)← .
(C : q)← .
B ← A∧¬C.
D ←C.
E ← B.
E ← D.
E ← B∧D.
The idea behind Hall’s definition is to check for counterfactual dependence in situations
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which are reductions of the actual situation, where a reduction is understood as “a variant
of this situation in which strictly fewer events occur”. In other words, because the coun-
terfactual dependence of E on C can be masked by the occurrence of events which are
extrinsic to the actual causal process, we look at all possible scenario’s in which there are
less of these extrinsic events. Hall puts it like this (Hall 2007, p. 129):
Suppose we have a causal model for some situation. The model consists of some equations, plus
a specification of the actual values of the variables. Those values tell us how the situation actually
unfolds. But the same system of equations can also represent nomologically possible variants: just
change the values of one or more exogenous variables, and update the rest in accordance with the
equations. A good model will thus be able to represent a range of variations on the actual situation.
Some of these variations will be – or more accurately, will be modeled as – reductions of the actual
situation, in that every variable will either have its actual value or its default value. Suppose the model
has variables for events C and E. Consider the conditional
if C = 0; then E = 0
This conditional may be true; if so, C is a cause of E. Suppose instead that it is false. Then C is a
cause of E iff there is a reduction of the actual situation according to which C and E still occur, and
in which this conditional is true.
Rather than speaking of fewer events occuring, in this definition Hall characterizes a
reduction in terms of whether or not variables retain their actual value. This is because in
the context of neuron diagrams, an event is the firing of a neuron, which is represented
by a variable taking on its deviant value, i.e., the variable becoming true. In the dynamic
context of CP-logic, the formal object that corresponds most naturally to Hall’s informal
concept of an event is the transition in a probability tree (i.e., the application of a causal
law) that makes such a variable true. Therefore we take a reduction to mean that no law is
applied such that it makes a variable true that did not become true in the actual setting.
To make this more precise, we introduce some new formal terminology. Let d be a
branch of a probability tree of the theory T . Lawsd denotes the set of all laws that were
applied in d. The resulting effect of the application of a law r ∈ Lawsd – i.e., the disjunct
of the head which was chosen – will be denoted by rd , or by 0 if an empty disjunct was
chosen. The set of true variables in the leaf of d will be denoted by Lea fd .
A branch d is a reduction of b iff ∀r ∈ Lawsd : rd = 0∨∃s ∈ Lawsb : rd = sb. Or, equiv-
alently, Lea fd ⊆ Lea fb.
A reduction of b in which both C and E occur – i.e., hold in its leaf – will be called a
(C,E)-reduction. The set of all of these will be denoted by Red(C,E)b . These are precisely
the branches which are relevant for Hall’s definition.
Definition 3
We define that C is an actual cause of E iff (∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PT d (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0).
Theorem 1 shows the correctness of our translation. Proofs of all theorems can be found in
the Appendices.
Theorem 1
Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its
variables V . Consider the CP-logic theory T and story b that we get when applying the
translation discussed above. Then C is an actual cause of E in the diagram according to
Hall’s definition iff C is an actual cause of E in b and T according to Definition 3.
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At first sight, Definition 3 does not fit into the general framework we introduced earlier,
because of the quantifier over different branches. However, we will now show that for a
significant group of cases it actually suffices to consider just a single T ′, which can be
described in terms of irrelevant and intrinsic laws.
Rather than looking at all of the reductions separately, we single out a minimal structure
which contains the essence of our story. In general such a minimal structure need not be
unique, as the story may contain elements none of which are necessary by themselves yet
without all of them the essence is changed. The following makes this more precise.
Definition 4
A law r is necessary iff
• ∀d ∈ Red(C,E)b : r ∈ Lawsd and
• ∀d,e ∈ Red(C,E)b : rd = re.
We define Nec(b) as the set of all necessary laws.
In general it might be that there are two (or more) edges which are unnecessary by
themselves, but at least one of them has to be present. Consider for example a case where
C causes both A and B, and each of those in return is sufficient to cause E . Then neither the
law r = A : ...←C nor the law r′ = B : ...←C is necessary, yet at least one of them has to
be applied to get E . In cases where this complication does not arise, we shall say that the
story is simple.
Definition 5
A story b is simple iff the following holds:
• ∀r ∈ Lawsb : the head of r contains at most two disjuncts;
• ∀d ∈ Red(C,E)b , for all non-deterministic r ∈ Lawsd \Nec(b) : ∃e ∈ Red
(C,E)
b so that
e = d up to the application of r, and rd 6= re.
As an example, note that the story in the previous paragraph is not simple. Neither law
r nor r′ is necessary. Now consider the (C,E)-reduction d where first r′ fails to cause B,
followed by r causing A, which in turn causes E . The branch that is identical to d up to and
including the application of r′ but in which r does not cause A, is not a (C,E)-reduction.
We are now in a position to formulate a theorem that will allow us to adjust Hall’s
definition into our framework.
Theorem 2
If (∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PTd (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0) then PT Nec(b)(¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. If b is simple,
then the reverse implication holds as well.
It is possible to add an additional criterion to turn this theorem into an equivalence that
also holds for non-simple stories. We choose not to do this, because all of the examples
Hall discusses are simple, as are all of the classical examples discussed in the literarure,
such as Early and Late Preemption, Symmetric Overdetermination, Switches, etc.
As a result of this theorem, rather than having to look at all (C,E)-reductions and cal-
culate their associated probabilities, we need only find all the necessary laws and calculate
a single probability. If the story b is simple, then this probability represents an extension
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of Hall’s definition, since they are equivalent if one ignores the value of the probability but
for it being 0 or not. To obtain a workable definition of actual causation, we present a more
constructive description of necessary laws. From now on we call the node resulting from
the application of a law r in b Nodebr .
Theorem 3
If b is simple, then a non-deterministic law r is necessary iff there is no (C,E)-reduction
passing through a sibling of Nodebr .
With this result, we can finally formulate our version of Hall’s definition, which we will
refer to as Hall07.
Hall07-Irrelevant 1
No law r is irrelevant.
Hall07-Intrinsic 1
A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b, and there is no branch d passing through a sibling
of Nodebr such that {C,E} ⊆ Lea fd ⊆ Lea fb.
3.4 Hall 2004 Definitions
(Hall 2004) claims that it is impossible to account for the wide variety of examples in
which we intuitively judge there to be actual causation by using a single, all-encompassing
definition. Therefore he defines two different concepts which both deserve to be called
forms of causation but are nonetheless not co-extensive.
3.4.1 Dependence
The first of these is simply Dependence, as stated in Definition 1. As mentioned earlier,
Hall only considers deterministic causal relations, and thus the probabilistic counterfactual
will either be 1 or 0.
3.4.2 Production
The second concept tries to express the idea that to cause something is to bring it about, or
to produce it. The original, rather technical, definition can be found in the appendices, but
the following informal version suffices for our purposes: C is a producer of E iff there is a
directed path of firing neurons in the diagram from C to E . In our framework, this translates
to the following.
Production-Irr 1
A law r is irrelevant iff r was not applied before E in b, or if its effect was already true
when it was applied.
Production-Intr 1
A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b.
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Theorem 4
Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its
variables V . Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that we get when applying the
translation discussed earlier. C is a producer of E in the diagram according to Hall iff C is
a producer of E in b and T according to the CP-logic version stated here.
Besides providing a probabilistic extension, the CP-logic version of production also of-
fers a way to make sense of causation by omission. That is, just as with all of the definitions
in our framework in fact, we can extend it to allow negative literals such as ¬C to be causes
as well.
4 Comparison
Table 1 presents a schematic overview of the four definitions discussed so far, as well as
two new ones, that we give appropriate names. The columns and rows give the criteria for
a law r of T to be considered intrinsic, respectively irrelevant, in relation to a story b, and
an event E . By r ≤b E , we denote that r was applied in b before E occurred.
Table 1: Spectrum of definitions
Irrelevant Intrinsic
r ∈ Lawsb r ∈ Nec(b)
/0 Dependence Hall07
∃d : (d = b up to E)∧ r ≥d E BV12 BV07
r ≮b E ∨ rb <b r Production Production07
In order to illustrate the working of the definitions and to highlight their differences, we
present an example:
Assassin decides to poison the meal of a victim, who subsequently Dies right before dessert.
However, Murderer decided to murder the victim as well, so he poisoned the dessert. If Assassin had
failed to do his job, then Backup would have done so all the same.
The causal laws that form the context of this story are give by the following theory:
(Assassin : p)← .
(Murderer : q)← .
(Backup : r)←¬Assassin.
Dies ← Assassin.
Dies ← Backup.
Dies ← Murderer.
In this story, did Assassin cause Dies? We leave it to the reader to verify that in this case the
left intrinsicness condition from the table applies to the first two non-deterministic laws,
whereas the right one only applies to the first. The second irrelevance condition only ap-
plies to the last law, whereas the third one applies to the last two laws and to the third. This
results in the following probabilities representing the causal status of Assassin:
12 S. Beckers and J. Vennekens
Production BV12 Hall07 Dependence
1 1− r (1− r)∗ (1− q) 0
Different motivations can be provided for these answers:
• Production: Assassin brought about the death of the victim all by himself, hence he
is the full cause.
• BV12: If Assassin hadn’t killed him, then that omission itself would not have lead to
victim’s death with a probability of (1− r). Hence, Assassin is a cause of the death
to this extent.
• Hall07: Ignoring the actually redundant Murderer, if Assassin doesn’t kill him, then
there is a (1− r)∗ (1− q) probability that the victim will die. Hence he is the cause
to that extent.
• Dependence: The victim would have died anyway, so Assassin is not a cause at all.
Rather than saying that only one of these answers is correct, we prefer to think of them
as answering different questions, all of which have their use in some context or other. (Eg.,
to determine responsibility, understand Assassin’s state of mind, minimize the chance of
murders, etc.) More generally, the definitions could be characterized by describing which
events are allowed to happen in the counterfactual worlds they take into consideration to
judge causation.
• Production: Only those events – i.e., applications of laws – which led to E , and not
differently – i.e., with the same outcome as in the actual story.
• BV12: Those events which led to E , and not differently, and also those events which
were prevented from happening by these.
• Hall07: Any event can happen, as long as those events that were essential to lead to
E do not happen differently.
• Dependence: Any event can happen, as long as those events that did actually happen
do not happen differently.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have used the formal language of CP-logic to formulate a general defi-
nition of actual causation, which we used to express four specific definitions: a proposal
of our own, and three definitions based on the work of Hall. By moving from the deter-
ministic context of neuron diagrams to the non-deterministic context of CP-logic, the latter
definitions improve on the original ones in two ways: they can deal with a wider class of
examples, and they allow for a graded judgment of actual causation in the form of a condi-
tional probability. Further, comparison between the definitions is facilitated by presenting
them as various ways of filling in two central concepts. We have illustrated the flexibility
of CP-logic in expressing different definitions, opening the path to other proposals beyond
the ones here discussed.
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6 Appendices
To facilitate the proof of the first theorem, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Given a neuron diagram D with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its
variables V . Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that we get when applying the
translation discussed earlier. Then a neuron diagram R is a reduction of D in which both C
and E occur iff its translation d – another branch of T – is a (C,E)-reduction of b.
Proof
Assume we have a reduction R of a neuron diagram D, and b is the story corresponding
to D. As R is simply a different assignment of the variables occurring in D, brought about
by the same equations that existed for D, this reduction corresponds to another branch d
of T , in which C and E hold in its leaf. Moreover, R can be constructed starting from D by
changing some of the exogenous variables, say U ′, from their actual values to their default
value, and then updating the endogenous variables in accordance with the deterministic
equations. It being a reduction, this caused no new variables to take on their deviant value
in comparison to D. Let r be a law that occurs in d.
If r is non-deterministic, it must be one of the laws representing an exogenous variable
V , i.e., a law with an empty body, and hence it was also applied in b. R being a reduction,
either V has the same value in R as in the original diagram, or it has its default value. In
the former case, this means that rd = rb, in the latter case rd = 0, both of which satisfy the
requirement for d being a reduction.
If r is deterministic, the precondition for r has to be fulfilled in d, causing some variable
V to take on its deviant value. The same must hold true of the precondition for the equation
for V , and thus V takes on its deviant value in R as well, implying it did so in D too.
Therefore there must have been some law applied in b that made V take on its deviant
value as well. From this it follows that d is a (C,E)-reduction of b.
Now assume we have a theory T and a story b that form the translation of a neuron
diagram D, such that C and E hold in b, and that d is a (C,E)-reduction of b. As the leaf
of d contains an assignment to all of the variables that satisfies the equations of M, there is
a neuron diagram R that corresponds to d. We can easily go over all the previous steps in
the other direction, to conclude that R is a reduction of D in which C and E are true.
Theorem 1
Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its
variables V . Consider the CP-logic theory T and story b that we get when applying the
translation discussed above. Then C is an actual cause of E in the diagram according to
Hall’s definition iff C is an actual cause of E in b and T according to Definition 3.
Proof
We start with the implication from left to right. Assume we have a neuron diagram D, in
which both C and E fire. This translates into a theory T and a story b, for which C and E
hold in its leaf. Further, assume there is a reduction R of this diagram, in which both C and
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E continue to hold, and in this reduction, if C = 0; then E = 0. By the above lemma, this
translates into a (C,E)-reduction of b, say d.
In R, if C = 0; then E = 0. The conditional C = 0 is interpreted as a counterfactual locu-
tion, and corresponds to do(¬C). As there are no non-deterministic laws with non-empty
preconditions, T d is simply the deterministic theory that determines the same assignment
as R, meaning PT d (¬E|do(¬C)) = 1, which concludes this part of the proof.
Now assume we have a theory T and a story b that form the translation of a neuron
diagram D, such that C and E hold in b, and that d is a (C,E)-reduction of b for which the
given inequality holds. By the above lemma, the translation of d, say R, is reduction of D
in which C and E occur. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, T d simply corresponds
to an assignment of values to the variables occurring in D that follows its equations. Since
R describes this same assignment, in R too if C = 0; then E = 0. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 2
If (∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PTd (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0) then PT Nec(b)(¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. If b is simple,
then the reverse implication holds as well.
Proof
We start with proving the first implication. Assume we have a d ∈ Red(C,E)b such that
PTd (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. This implies that there is at least one branch e of a probability tree
of T d |do(¬C) for which ¬E holds in its leaf. We prove by induction on the length of e that
this implies the existence of a similar branch e′ of a probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C) for
which ¬E holds in its leaf, which is what is required to establish the theorem.
Base case: if e consists of a single node – i.e., the root node where all atoms are false –
then this means that no laws of T d |do(¬C) can be applied. Since the bodies of the laws in
T Nec(b)|do(¬C) are identical to those of the laws in T d |do(¬C), we simply have e′ = e.
Induction case: Assume we have a sub-branch en of e with length n > 1, starting from
the root node, and that we also have a structurally identical sub-branch e′n. By it being
structurally identical we mean that they are identical except for the fact that they may have
different probabilities along the edges.
If en = e, then no more laws can be applied in the final node of en. This must then hold
for the final node of e′n as well, so we are finished. Otherwise, we know that there is a
sub-branch en+1 which extends en along e with a node O. Assume that the law which was
applied to get to O is r.
If r is deterministic, then r occurs in T d |do(¬C) exactly as it does in T Nec(b)|do(¬C).
Since both branches are structurally identical, e′n can be extended in the exact same manner
as en, so there has to be a probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C) in which there is a sub-branch
e′n+1 with the desired properties. So assume r is non-deterministic.
First assume r 6∈ Lawsd . This implies that r 6∈ Nec(b). So as in the deterministic case, r
occurs in T d |do(¬C) exactly as it does in T Nec(b)|do(¬C), and the branch can be extended
in the same manner.
Now assume r ∈ Lawsd . If also r ∈ Nec(b), we know that rd = rb = rNec and hence the
previous argument holds. Remains the possibility that r 6∈ Nec(b). As in the deterministic
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case, because r can be applied in the final node of e′n there has to be a probability tree of
T Nec(b)|do(¬C) with a sub-branch like e′n where r is applied next.
Assume rd = A. Since A was the outcome of r in d, the law r as it appears in T –
and also in T Nec(b)|do(¬C) – contains A in its head with some probability attached to it.
Therefore the final node of e′n in the said probability tree has one child-node which contains
A, extending e′n into a sub-branch e′n+1 with the desired properties. This concludes this part
of the proof.
Now we prove that if b is simple, the reverse implication holds as well.
Assume PTNec(b) (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. This implies that there is at least one branch e of a
probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C) for which ¬E holds in its leaf. We can repeat the first
steps of the previous implication, so that we again arrive at a law r which was applied to
get to a node O.
The branch e′ we are considering occurs in a probability tree of a (C,E)-reduction, say
f . First assume r ∈ Nec(b). By definition, this implies that also r ∈ Laws f ∧ rNec = r f , and
we can apply the reasoning from above. Likewise as above, we can apply this reasoning
to all other cases, except the one where r 6∈ Nec(b), r is non-deterministic, and r ∈ Laws f .
Assume the law r has effect A in the branch e we are considering. If r f = A, then we are
back to our familiar situation, so therefore assume r f = B, and A 6= B.
Since b is simple, A and B are the only two possible effects of r. Further, remark that
r ∈ Lawsb \Nec(b). This implies the existence of a (C,E)-reduction g that is identical to
f up to the application of r, but such that rg 6= r f , and thus rg = A = re meaning there is a
branch in a probability tree of g that is structurally identical to e up to O. This concludes
the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 3
If b is simple, then a non-deterministic law r is necessary iff there is no (C,E)-reduction
passing through a sibling of Nodebr .
Proof
Say the unique sibling of Nodebr is M. We start with the implication from left to right, so
we assume r is necessary. Assume rb = A, then there is no d ∈ Red
(C,E)
b for which rd 6= A,
hence there is no (C,E)-reduction which passes through M.
Remains the implication from right to left. Assume we have a law r such that there is
no (C,E)-reduction passing through a sibling of Nodebr . We proceed with a reductio ad
absurdum, so we assume r is not necessary.
Clearly b is a (C,E)-reduction of itself, and also r ∈ Lawsb \Nec(b). Hence, by b’s
simplicity, there is a (C,E)-reduction e which is identical to b up to the application of
r, but for which re 6= rb. Thus e passes through the sibling of Nodebr , contradicting the
assumption that r is necessary. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4
Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its
variables V . Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that we get when applying the
translation discussed earlier. C is a producer of E in the diagram according to Hall iff C is
a producer of E in b and T according to the CP-logic version stated here.
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Proof
First we need to explain some terminology that Hall uses. A structure is a temporal se-
quence of sets of events, which unfold according to the equations of some neuron diagram.
A branch, or a sub-branch, would be the corresponding concept in CP-logic.
Two structures are said to match intrinsically when they are represented in an identical
manner. The reason why Hall uses this term, is because even though we use the same
variable for an event occurring in different circumstances, strictly speaking they are not
the same. This is mainly an ontological issue, which need not detain us for our present
purposes.
A set of events S is said to be sufficient for another event E , if the fact that E occurs
follows from the causal laws, together with the premisse that S occurs at some time t,
and no other events occur at this time. A set is minimally sufficient if it is sufficient, and
no proper subset is. To understand this, note that the ambiguity of the relation between
an event and the value of a variable that we noted earlier, resurfaces here. In the context
of neuron diagrams, events are temporal, and occur during the time-period that a neuron
fires, i.e, becomes true. However, at any later time-point, the variable corresponding to
this neuron will remain to be true, implying that the value of the variable has shifted in
meaning from “the neuron fires” to “the neuron has fired”. Given this interpretation, it
is natural to translate Hall’s notion of an event into CP-logic as the application of a law,
making a variable true, as we have done.
A further detail to be cleared out, is that in the context of neuron diagrams there can be
simultaneous events, since multiple neurons can fire at the same time. In CP-logic, in each
node only one law is allowed to be applied, hence this translates to two consecutive edges
in a branch. Therefore it is not the case that each node-edge pair in a branch corresponds to
a separate time-point, but rather sets of consecutive pairs – with variable size – do. Given
such a set, then for each variable that was the result of the application of a law belonging
to it, it holds that its corresponding event occurs at the next time-point, corresponding to
the next set of nodes further down the branch. All the variables occuring in the bodies of
the laws in this set, represent events that occur during this time-point.
Now we can state the precise definition of production as it occurs in (Hall 2004, p.25).
We begin as before, by supposing that E occurs at t ′, and that t is an earlier time such that at
each time between t and t ′, there is a unique minimally sufficient set for E. But now we add the
requirement that whenever t0 and t1 are two such times (t0 < t1) and S0 and S1 the corresponding
minimally sufficient sets, then
• for each element of S1, there is at t0 a unique minimally sufficient set; and
• the union of these minimally sufficient sets is S0.
...
Given some event E occurring at time t ′ and given some earlier time t, we will say that E has
a pure causal history back to time t just in case there is, at every time between t and t ′, a unique
minimally sufficient set for E, and the collection of these sets meets the two foregoing constraints.
We will call the structure consisting of the members of these sets the “pure causal history” of E,
back to time t. We will say that C is a proximate cause of E just in case C and E belong to some
structure of events S for which there is at least one nomologically possible structure S′ such that (i)
S′ intrinsically matches S; and (ii) S′ consists of an E-duplicate, together with a pure causal history
of this E-duplicate back to some earlier time. (In easy cases, S will itself be the needed duplicate
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structure.) Production, finally, is defined as the ancestral [i.e., the transitive closure] of proximate
causation.
We will start with the implication from left to right. So assume we have a neuron diagram
D, in which C is a producer of E . Say T is the CP-logic theory that is the translation of the
equations of the diagram, and b is the branch representing the story. We already know that
C and E hold in the leaf of b. We need to proof that PT ′(¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. The theory T ′
only contains deterministic laws, and no disjunctions, hence all its laws are of the form:
V ← A∧A′ ∧ ...∧¬B∧¬B′ , where the number of positive literals in the conjunction is at
least one. Therefore any probability tree for T ′ consists out of only one branch, determining
a unique assignment for all the variables. Further, even though the theory T may contain
several laws in which a variable occurs in the head, because of our irrelevance criterion
T ′ contains exactly one law for every variable that is true. So for every true variable in
this assignment, there is a unique chain of laws – neglecting the order – which needs to
be applied to make this variable true. For any such variable V , we will say that it depends
on all of the variables occurring positively in the body of a law in this chain. Clearly, if
any true variable changes its value in this assignment, then all variables which depend on
it become false.
As a first case, assume C is a proximate cause of E . We start by assuming that circum-
stances are nice, meaning that D contains itself a structure S which is a pure causal history
of E . This means that in the actual story b, C is part of a unique minimally sufficient set
for E . From this it follows that in T ′, C figures positively in one of the laws on which E
depends. Hence, if we apply do(¬C), then E will no longer hold.
Now assume that there is a structure S occurring in D, such that there exists another
diagram, say D′, in which this structure occurs as well, and forms a pure causal history
of E . This diagram corresponds to a branch of T , say d, That means that in T ′d – i.e., the
theory T ′ constructed out d – C occurs positively in the unique chain of laws which can
make E true. But as all events in S also occur in D, at the same moments as they do in D′,
that means that C must also occur positively in the unique chain of laws for E in the theory
T ′b . Hence, E depends on C in the theory T ′b as well.
Now look at the more general case, in which C occurs in a chain of proximate causes,
that leads up to E . I.e, in D, C is the proximate cause of some variable V1, which in turn is
the proximate cause of some variable V2, and so on until we get to E . We know from the
previous discussion, that this implies in T ′ that do(¬C) then ¬V1, and do(¬V1) then ¬V2,
and so on. Given what we know about T ′, it directly follows that when we apply do(¬C),
then ¬E . This concludes this part of the proof.
We continue with the implication from right to left. So assume that we are given again
a neuron diagram and a corresponding story b, and that we know PT ′(¬E|do(¬C)) > 0.
From our earlier analysis of T ′, we know that this means that C occurs positively in the
unique chain of laws that can make E true according to T ′. From this chain of laws, we
start from the one causing E and from there pick out a series that gets us to a law where C
occurs positively in the body. More concretely, we take a series of the form: E ← ...A∧ ...,
A ← ...D∧ ..., and so on until we get at a law Z ← ...C∧ .... By definition of production, it
suffices to prove that in this chain, each of the variables in the body is a proximate cause
of the variable in the head.
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Take such a law V ← ...W ∧ .... At the time that this law is applied, W clearly is a member
of a sufficient set of events for V , which occurs at the next time point. Say S0 is the set of all
events that occur together with W that figure in the body of this law, and S1 is the set {V}
that occurs at the next time-point, then the structure consisting precisely of S0 and S1 and
nothing else forms a pure causal history of V containing W . The same reasoning applies to
all laws of the chain. This concludes the proof.
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